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Civil society actors have been pushing for greater accountability of the World Bank for at least 
three decades. This paper outlines the range of accountability mechanisms currently in place at 
the World Bank along four basic levels: (1) staff, (2) project, (3) policy, and (4) board 
governance. We argue that civil society organizations have been influential in pushing for greater 
accountability at the project and policy levels, particularly through the establishment and 
enforcement of social and environmental safeguards and complaint and response mechanisms. 
But they have been much less successful in changing staff incentives for accountability to 
affected communities, or in improving board accountability through greater transparency in 
decision making, more representative vote allocation, or better parliamentary scrutiny. In other 
words, although civil society efforts have led to some gains in accountability with respect to 
Bank policies and projects, the deeper structural features of the institution — the incentives staff 
face and how the institution is governed— remain largely unchanged.  
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Among institutions of global governance, the World Bank is one of the most visible and most 
frequently targeted by civil society organizations (CSOs) located in both the global North and 
South. The critiques vary widely. On one hand are those who see the Bank as the fount of a 
neoliberal globalizing agenda responsible for increasing poverty and indebtedness by promoting 
inequitable  projects  and  policies.  On  the  other  hand  are  those  who  see  the  institution  as  a 
necessary multilateral actor in global development, but much in need of reform. The tactics of 
these  civil  society  critics  have  also  varied  greatly,  ranging  from  highly  visible  protests  and 
confrontations about social and environmental impacts of Bank activities, to more collaborative 
efforts with management and staff in order to gain influence from the inside.  
 
What difference has this civil society activism made? More specifically, how and to what extent 
have civil society actors furthered the accountability of the World Bank to its constituents?  The 
case of the World Bank is important to the central question of this volume for two main reasons: 
the Bank has not only been a major target of civil society activism, but it has also been 
comparatively responsive in developing various forms of engagement with civil society, possibly 
more than any other multilateral institution. 
 
We begin this paper with a brief introduction to the World Bank, followed by a set of normative 
arguments on the key accountability challenges facing the institution. We then provide an 
overview of the accountability mechanisms currently in place at four different organizational 
levels in the World Bank. While this approach does not enable an investigation of each 
mechanism in depth, it has the advantage of situating accountability efforts within a complex 
organizational landscape, and the roles of civil society actors within it. We then discuss, in more 
detail, efforts undertaken by civil society groups to increase accountability — especially in terms 
of the Bank’s own policies and projects. We note both the successes and failures of these reform 
efforts.
2 Finally, we close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for 
understanding the deeper structural conditions of global governance. 
 
THE WORLD BANK’S DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGE 
 
A Snapshot of the World Bank Group 
 
Created in 1944, in the midst of World War II by delegates from all forty-four allied nations, the 
so-called Bretton Woods institutions were designed to serve two distinct functions. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to stabilize the international monetary system, 
particularly in response to the disintegration of the world economy resulting from the Great 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to numerous individuals: to Jan Aart Scholte for his invitation to present an earlier version 
of this paper at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden in June, 2007 as part of a larger project on “Civil Society and 
Accountable Global Governance;” to Srilatha Batliwala for extensive comments and for crystallizing the “deep 
structure” element of our argument; and, to Rachel Winter-Jones, John Garrison, and Carolyn Reynolds-Mandel of 
the World Bank’s Global Civil Society Team for their very helpful and generous feedback. Responsibility for the 
content and opinions reflected in this paper rests solely with the authors. 
2 We do not examine civil society initiatives that aim to shut down the institution, although we note that these are 
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Depression and the war. At the same time, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) was formed with the more limited purpose of funding post-war 
reconstruction largely in Europe and Japan. Both were to be headquartered in Washington, D.C. 
 
The IBRD later expanded its mission to the funding of “development” activities, and is now the 
primary lending arm of the World Bank Group which is comprised of five organizations: the 
IBRD, the International Development Association (IDA) , the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The mission of the group is “To fight poverty 
with passion and professionalism for lasting results. To help people help themselves and their 
environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging 
partnerships in the public and private sectors.”
3 The focus of this paper is primarily on the IBRD 
and IDA, which are intended to provide funding to Southern governments for development 
activities, particularly to countries which might otherwise find it difficult to secure financing.
4  
 
Figure 1 is the official organization chart provided by the World Bank. The diagram points to 
several structural features relevant to accountability which are discussed further below: a) the 
organization has a two-tier governance structure, with a governing board made up of 
representatives from 185 member countries, from which an executive board with 24 directors is 
formed; b) the president reports to both boards, although he is selected by the U.S. government 
under an informal “gentleman’s agreement” with the Europeans who select the head of the IMF; 
c) most of the units in the Bank (i.e., the regions and networks) report to a managing director 
who reports to the president; and, d) two units report directly to the board rather than to 
management (i.e., independent evaluation and the inspectional panel). Altogether, the World 
Bank Group employs about 10,000 staff, of which approximately seventy percent are based in 
Washington, DC (World Bank 2006c).
5 
 




The normative arguments for increasing Bank accountability to citizens and civil society are a 
result of its role as both a public and a development organization.  Not all global institutions 
examined in this volume have these two characteristics, both of which are accompanied by a set 
of expectations, or imperatives, about what constitutes accountable behavior.
6 First, as a public 
                                                 
3 See http://go.worldbank.org/DM4A38OWJ0, accessed August 30, 2007 
4 The IBRD provides loans to governments, charging interest to recover the cost of borrowing. The IDA was created 
in 1960 to provide concessional loans, often below market interest rates, to the poorest governments (Patomäki and 
Teivainen 2004), and now also provides interest-free loans and grants. The IFC and MIGA provide financing to the 
private sector, with the former providing loans and equity finance, and the latter encouraging foreign investment by 
providing guarantees against loss. The ICSID assists in settling investment disputes between foreign investors and 
host countries (World Bank 2006c). 
5 To put this number in perspective, consider that Microsoft Corporation employs about 76,000 people worldwide, 
and the Bangladeshi NGO BRAC employs about 40,000.  
6 Among the institutions studied in this volume, those with both a public and developmental purpose include the 
UN, the IMF, the OECD, the Global Fund,  and the Commonwealth Secretariat. This is less explicit in the case of 
ICANN, the OIC,  the WTO, and IFAT, or arguably even among leadership summits such as the G8 and ASEM. Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  4 
institution, the Bank’s legitimacy relies on decision making processes that, at the very least, 
conform to basic public expectations and norms about transparency, participation and responsive 
governance.
7 As the public increasingly expects that democratic principles will inform 
international as well as national decision-making, the pressure on international institutions to 
democratize and pluralize their decision-making will only rise. Indeed, most, if not all public 
international institutions have been forced to at least begin to re-align their decision-making with 
these expectations (e.g., Asian Development Bank 2004; United Nations 2004). The Bank, no 
less than these other institutions, is under public pressure to meet this challenge in order to earn 
and maintain public support for its policies and programs (Falk and Strauss 2001: 220) .  
 
Second, the Bank’s effectiveness as a development institution relies on a degree of inclusiveness 
and responsiveness to “the poor” whose lives are affected by its work. The World Bank has 
consistently found a high correlation between the extent and quality of public participation and 
overall  project  quality  (World  Bank  1996;  2000c;  2002a;  2006d).  Moreover,  democratic 
participation and accountability have also been shown to be critical in enabling societies to avert 
catastrophes  such  as  war  and  famines  by  providing  governments  with  the  information  and 
political incentives necessary to avoid them (Sen 1999: 51, 180-181; Singer 2002: 132). Equally 
important, development is now understood to be a multidimensional challenge that is broader 
than alleviating income poverty (Bradlow 2004: 207). It includes improving the capacity of the 
poor  to  exercise  voice  and  political  power  to  gain  equitable  access  to  resources  and 
opportunities, and to defend their rights and interests in the political process (Narayan 1999: 
7,12). As the World Bank has recognized, empowering the poor to influence the decisions that 
will affect their lives is therefore a critical dimension of development (McGee and Norton 2000: 
68; World Bank 2002b: vi). This requires that the poor must be able to express their interests, 
and to impose sanctions on decision-makers that fail to respond effectively to those interests 
(World Bank 2004b: 79). Many civil society efforts to enhance accountability in the World Bank 
have thus sought to increase the influence of the poor, particularly through timely access to 
information,  direct  participation  in  the  design  and  monitoring  of  development  projects,  and 
access to instruments of redress.  
 
In other words, the World Bank faces two basic challenges related to democratic accountability: 
a  challenge  of  democratic  legitimacy  premised  on  its  public  nature,  and  a  challenge  of 
effectiveness premised on its developmental purpose. As the scholar Ngaire Woods has argued, 
these  dual  challenges  are  inter-linked  and  mutually  reinforcing,  thus  making  it  essential  in 
institutions of global governance to enhance both legitimacy and effectiveness (Woods 2007).  
 
 
THE LANDSCAPE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK 
 
We turn now to an exploration of the various mechanisms of accountability currently in place at 
the World Bank. Table 1 is a preliminary attempt to organize the disparate range of mechanisms 
into four “levels” of accountability. The first column identifies the levels at which the 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that many of the governments of countries that are members of the Bank don’t necessarily 
subscribe to such norms of good governance. Nonetheless, this does not obviate the fact that the Bank itself is a 
public institution that espouses norms of good governance, and it can thus be expected to uphold practices of 
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accountability  mechanisms operate — i.e., whether they target staff, projects, internal bank 
policies, or board governance. The second column lists a number of mechanisms that are 
currently in place to varying degrees in the Bank, while the third notes some of the resultant 
accountability gaps. The levels are not sealed off from one another, but can interact. For 
example, Bank policies on disclosure or environmental safeguards ultimately affect  both the 
compliance requirements at the project level, and the technocratic expectations at the staff level. 
Each level, and its associated “regime,” is discussed in detail below. 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
Staff Level Accountability 
 
Like  most  large  and  complex  bureaucracies,  the  World  Bank  has  multiple  and,  at  times, 
competing  organizational  cultures  and  incentive  structures  that  influence  its  priorities, 
accountability, and effectiveness.
8 Attention to the people affected by Bank projects, and to civil 
society groups, is important as a means of enabling “downward” accountability to citizens, rather 
than  simply  “upward”  accountability  to  donor  governments.
9  What,  then,  are  the  incentives 
within the institution for staff to pay attention to the voices and interests of those affected by 
their projects? In other words, what are the incentives for encouraging participation by the poor? 
  
Overall, task managers “paint a sobering picture of the environment for participation within the 
Bank”  (World  Bank  2000c:  25).  Impediments  to  engaging  project-affected  people  include 
insufficient funding, inadequate time for mission work in the field, pressure to process loans and 
disburse funds rapidly, and inadequate support from management (World Bank 2000c: 25-27; 
World Bank 2005b: 16, para 30). The main constraints may be grouped as follows: 
 
•  Resources  for  civil  society  engagement  are  significant,  but  are  not  systematically 
available for all projects. While there are considerable funds for conscientious task 
managers  (or  team  leaders)  who  wish  to  seek  them,  they  are  not  earmarked  or 
allocated,  a  priori,  across  projects.
10  This  means  that  task  managers  interested  in 
citizen participation can obtain resources for it, but those who are less interested face 
no positive incentives. The problem thus remains that community participation and 
accountability are frequently viewed by managers as “add ons” and a drain on time 
and  capacity.  This  is  reflective  of  a  broader  climate  within  the  Bank,  in  which 
participation is encouraged but not mandated. 
•  Staff appraisals do not evaluate the quality and impact of participatory mechanisms 
employed by staff. Staff have neither positive nor negative incentives to improve the 
quality  of  participation  beyond  compliance  with  the  letter  of  consultation 
requirements.  Guidance  and  training  are  optional,  and  incentives  to  improve 
participation skills are weak. As a result, consultations with citizens can be held for 
                                                 
8 For a  broader look at this set of issues, see (Tendler 1975; Wilson 1989: 90-110). 
9 The distinctions between upward and downward accountability in international development contexts draw from 
Edwars and Hulme(1996) and Najam (1996). 
10 Budgets for engaging the public have grown substantially and there are about 120 staff worldwide who serve as 
civil society focal points and have access to funds for organizing consultations with CSOs. Other resources to task 
managers include communications officers (some 300 across the institution) and about 100 public information 
centers worldwide (Email communication with World Bank Civil Society Team, August 31, 2007). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  6 
the limited purpose of technically complying with policy requirements, rather than to 
enhance accountability to affected communities. 
•  Lending  pressures  reward  quick  appraisal  and  disbursement,  and  deference  to 
borrower governments. Moving money is valued for promotion, while attention to 
participatory monitoring and evaluation generally is not. Furthermore, rigid and short 
project  cycles  do  not  allow  for  time-consuming  and  labor-intensive  participatory 
planning processes. 
•  Technical expertise is highly valued in justifying project and policy lending decisions, 
for recruitment, and for maintaining one’s status in the organization. This deference 
to technical expertise appears to be at odds with considering a full range of alternative 
policy and project options which may require collaborative, rather than authoritative, 
use of knowledge. Thus, the emphasis on technical expertise serves as a disincentive 
to public engagement. 
 
The  accountability  regime  operating  at  the  level  of  professional  staff  may  be  described  as 
technocratic due to its emphasis on technical skills and knowledge, and the dearth of incentives 
and resources for citizen engagement and participation. These factors serve as disincentives, 
even  to  well-meaning  staff,  in  spending  scarce  time  and  resources  on  developing  means  of 
downward accountability to citizen groups and affected communities.  
 
These observations about the incentive structure for professional staff within the Bank are not 
new.  An  internal  World  Bank  task  force  in  1992,  headed  by  then  Vice  President  Willi 
Wapenhans,  famously  described  a  “culture  of  approval”  within  the  Bank.  The  Wapenhans 
Report called into question the credibility of the Bank’s appraisal process, observing that many 
Bank staff used appraisals as marketing devices for securing loans – as part of “an ‘approval 
culture’ in which appraisal becomes advocacy” (World Bank 1992: 14, 16). Staff surveyed for 
that report provided various reasons for poor portfolio performance management, with the most 
significant  factors  being  inadequate  resources,  especially  inadequate  time  for  supervision, 
deficient staff skills, distorted incentives, and pressures to lend (Thomas undated: 6; World Bank 
1992: 17).  
 
While it is not clear to what extent these same problems persist today, a 2005 Bank evaluation of 
its projects in Community-Based and Community-Driven Development (CBD/CDD) suggests 
they  remain  significant.  For  example,  pressures  associated  with  short  project  cycles  remain 
unchanged,  despite  a  recognition  that  the  one-year  subproject  cycle  typical  of  most  Bank 
activities is too short for participatory community projects. In terms of resources for staff, the 
report notes “the Bank’s preparation and supervision costs for CBD/CDD projects are already 
higher than for [other] projects, and there are no additional incentives for country directors to 
provide  the  additional  resources  required  to  prepare  and  supervise  these  operations”  (World 
Bank 2005c: pp. 21, 46). More pointedly, an appendix to the same report  includes feedback 
from a prominent advisory board member, Robert Chambers, who observes: “The staff incentive 
system of the Bank . . . rewards high and fast disbursements. This was a major factor which 
emerged from a participatory workshop for task managers which I facilitated a few years ago. 
Nothing I have heard suggests that this has changed significantly” (World Bank 2005c: 152).  
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Furthermore, the Bank’s recent return to higher-risk large infrastructure projects, particularly in 
middle-income countries with better repayment rates, suggests that the pressures to move money 
remain  strong.  This  is  evidenced  by  a  heightened  concern  that  the  transactions  costs  of  its 
environmental and social safeguard policies are a substantial impediment to doing business in 
middle-income  countries  (World  Bank  2001b;  World  Bank  2005a:  5,8),  and  even  in  poorer 
countries  given  the  increasing  availability  of  loans  from  China  which  come  without  such 
conditions (Wallis 2007). This erosion of the Bank’s market, coupled with a deference to large 
borrower  governments  which may  not  be  particularly  receptive  to citizen accountability  and 
participation in the first place, serve to reinforce lending pressures at the expense of civil society 
engagement and downward accountability.  
 
Yet, despite the institutional disincentives and lack of management support, task managers who 
are willing to attempt participation tend to believe strongly in its benefits. The overwhelming 
majority of task managers that employ participatory processes believe that it has improved the 
quality of the operations that they manage. As a result, experience with public participation 
motivates more participation (Rukuba-Ngaiza et al. 2002: 8, 25; World Bank 2005b: 21).
 Two 
units within the Bank — the Civil Society Team and the Participation and Civic Engagement 
Team — have consistently sought to support staff in engaging with civil society, and to raise the 
profile of such engagement within the institution.  
 
Their  recommendations  for  more  systematically  drawing  on  civil  society experience and  for 
improving the Bank’s responsiveness to communities and civic groups were detailed in a report 
titled Issues and Options for Improving Engagement between the World Bank and Civil Society 
(World Bank 2005b). The report laid out a ten-point action plan, which included a review of 
funding opportunities and procurement framework for civil society engagement, developing new 
guidelines for collaboration with CSOs, holding regular meetings with senior management and 
the  Board  to  review  Bank-civil  society  relations,  and  better  supporting  staff  through  an 
institution-wide advisory service and learning program. Two years on, progress on this action 
plan has been mixed, having been slowed in part by two presidential transitions. On one hand, 
training offerings and a help desk have been expanded and revised, and guidance materials for 
mapping civil society are in development.
11 On the other hand, efforts to create a new formal 
mechanism  for  global  civil  society  engagement  have  not  been  reciprocated  by  interest  from 
international  civil  society  groups  (many  of  which  were  involved  in  previous  consultative 
processes). As of late 2007, the Bank’s engagement with civil society may thus be described as 
primarily  issue-  or  country-focused,  supplemented  twice  annually  with  civil  society  forums 
organized by the Bank around its fall and spring meetings. 
 
Finally, two important accountability features at the staff level are the World Bank’s Internal 
Audit Department, and its Department of Institutional Integrity (INT). The former overseas risk 
management and internal controls, while that latter investigates allegations of  misconduct, fraud, 
and corruption at the Bank, both among its staff and its operations. Both units report directly to 
the  Bank  president  (as  shown  in  the  organization  chart  in  Figure  1).  A  look  at  INT’s  most 
recently  available  annual  report  suggests  that  it  has  been  quite  active:  since  1999  it  has 
sanctioned 337 firms and individuals for corruption or fraud; in 2005-6 alone it debarred 58 
firms and 54 individuals; and of  78 staff cases it investigated in 2005-6, it fired or barred from 
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rehire 43 and disciplined eleven. The department also investigates allegations by whistleblowers, 
while providing confidentiality and certain protections against retaliation.
12 
 
At the same time, INT has come under heavy scrutiny from civil society for failing to uphold 
standards  of  integrity  itself,  with  allegations  including:  a  conflict  of  interest  concerning  the 
department director who also serves as a counselor to the Bank president (thus compromising 
credibility  and  independence  from  management);  routine  breaches  of  confidentiality  during 
investigations between 2005-2007; complex personal, professional and financial relationships 
among the department, American political actors, and a corporate intelligence firm; a failure to 
comply  with  an  authorized  audit,  which  was  suspended  by  former  Bank  president  Paul 
Wolfowitz in March 2007; and a series of allegations concerning suppression of information or 
failure to investigate specific projects.
13  
 
Some of these critiques are supported by a review of INT by a panel of outside experts that was 
conducted at the request of the Bank. Headed by Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Board, the panel noted several important achievements by the department,  but 
expressed concern about both the independence and operational context of INT. On the issue of 
independence, the panel suggested dropping the role of counselor to the president by the head of 
INT,  and  forming  an  external  Advisory  Oversight  Board  made  up  of  “widely  respected 
individuals with strong professional credentials drawn from outside the Bank” (Volcker et al. 
2007:3).  The  panel  also  suggested  modifications  to  the  disclosure  practices  for  greater 
transparency and to better enable cross checking of information for factual accuracy. The panel 
also noted “serious operational issues and severe strains in relations with some Operations units” 
observing in particular that: 
 
Investigators—even  well-trained  investigators  acting  with  the  highest  professional 
standards—are not typically candidates for popularity prizes in any organization. Within 
the World Bank the tensions and resistance have been particularly strong. . . .There is a 
tendency  as  well  to  shrink  from  confrontation  with  borrowing  countries  .  .  .[that]  is 
reinforced by a culture of the Bank that favors seeking out lending opportunities rather 




In sum, while the technocratic accountability regime at the staff level is supported by numerous 
formal mechanisms — staff appraisals, integrity and audit functions, and considerable resources 
for citizen engagement —  there remain two key sets of gaps. The first, involving the Department 
of Institutional Integrity, concerns the actual independence of the unit from management, which 
has been called into question by allegations of conflict of interest and political interference. The 
second, and perhaps more critical, gap is the persistence of a culture of lending and approval 
within operational units, and the absence of incentives for task managers to systematically secure 
citizen voice and downward accountability. Although there are significant resources available to 
                                                 
12 The Bank’s whistleblower policy was under revision, in consultation with the  Bank Staff Association, at the time 
of this writing. 
13 This critique is taken from a report released by a whistleblower group at the time of this writing (Government 
Accountability Project 2007). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  9 
task managers for citizen engagement, these are neither available a priori to all projects, nor are 
they backed up by incentives or mandates for participation. As a result, while the Bank has 
increasingly encouraged citizen participation and accountability to the poor, this is structurally 
undermined  by  the  persistence  of  performance  incentives  and  lending  pressures  that  remain 
largely unchanged.  
 
Project Level Accountability 
 
The project level contains a number of highly developed mechanisms of accountability, many of 
which have emerged as a result of civil society pressure. The most noteworthy of these are: 
 
•  An information disclosure policy designed to increase transparency and access to 
Bank documents, and to make them available online and through public information 
centers in various countries and languages; 
•  A series of ten safeguard policies that detail the procedures and protections that must 
be followed when a project is likely to have significant social and environmental 
impacts;  
•  An Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) that conducts detailed analyses of Bank 
activities and is accountable directly to the Bank’s board rather than to management. 
The aims of the IEG’s evaluations are “to learn from experience, to provide an 
objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank's work, and to provide 
accountability in the achievement of its objectives.”
14 The unit has frequently been 
critical of Bank activities, and its reports are often used by civil society organizations 
to buttress their own claims.  Internally, a Quality Assurance Group (QAG) supports 
staff in improving the quality of projects and impacts, and was created in the mid-
1990s as a result of IEG evaluations pointing to the failure of one-third of Bank 
projects to achieve their objectives.  
•  Two complaint and response mechanisms are also available to citizens and civil 
society, through which they may report possible violations by the Bank of its own 
policies (particularly of its social and environmental safeguards). These “redress” 
mechanisms are the World Bank Inspection Panel (for the public sector arm of the 
Bank) and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (for the private sector lending arm).  
 
This collection of project level accountability mechanisms may be described as part of a 
compliance regime, because of the emphasis on explicit internal policies and procedures that 
staff must follow.
15 The core of the compliance regime is the safeguard and disclosure policies 
— and it is thus directly affected by the quality of the consultations at the policy level through 
which such policies are reviewed (discussed below). 
 
Since the 1980s, civil society organizations have mounted sustained advocacy campaigns to hold 
the Bank accountable for the negative environmental and social impacts of its operations.
16 
                                                 
14 See the IEG’s website at www.worldbank.org/oed/about.html. This unit was formerly called the Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED). 
15 The Bank’s evaluation mechanisms, such as the IEG, are not strictly part of a “compliance regime” since they do 
not focus on compliance with policies, but are more concerned with assessing project quality and performance.  
16 For an elaboration of these efforts, see Fox and Brown (1998: 2) and Keck and Sikkink (1998). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  10 
These campaigns have been successful in forcing the Bank to consider the negative impacts of its 
lending operations, and to adopt a set of safeguard policies on sensitive issues such as 
environmental impacts, involuntary resettlement, and the impacts on indigenous peoples.
17 For 
civil society organizations and affected peoples, these policies have become the touchstone of the 
Bank’s accountability for the impacts of its projects. They represent normative commitments by 
the Bank regarding the planning processes and development outcomes that it will require for a 
project or program to be eligible to receive its support. They also establish minimum standards 
regarding how the rights and interests of locally affected communities will be protected, and 
provide some assurances that the costs of Bank-financed projects will not be disproportionately 
borne by vulnerable members of society or their environment. Some of the safeguard policies, 
including the Environmental Assessment, Indigenous Peoples, and Involuntary Resettlement 
Policies, also provide minimum guarantees that local communities will have the opportunity to 
participate in decisions that affect them.  
 
Mechanisms of quasi-judicial accountability, such as the Inspection Panel (IP) and the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), kick in when public complaints are filed by persons 
who believe they have been harmed (or are likely to be harmed) by Bank-supported projects. The 
IP operates independently of Bank management, reporting directly to the executive board. In the 
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, it received seven complaints. Its investigations focus on determining 
whether the Bank has violated its own operational policies and procedures, particularly the 
safeguards.  In contrast, the CAO plays a more flexible role in the Bank’s private-sector 
operations, sometimes responding to complaints as an ombudsman, but also overseeing audits of 
compliance with social and environmental performance requirements.
 18 In 2005 and 2006, it 
received 27 complaints, of which it accepted 18 for further investigation. The CAO reports to the 
Bank president (rather than the board) and also functions as an advisor to the president and 
management on issues of social and environmental policy (World Bank 2006d: 12-13).
19  
 
In short, the very existence of the Bank’s safeguard policies and complaint and response 
mechanisms may be seen as a major “success” in civil society efforts to hold the institution to 
account. However, as we elaborate in the third section of this paper, some of these gains have 
been eroded in revisions of a number of safeguards in recent years, particularly at the IFC.
20 
Similarly, we note a series of limitations in the Bank’s disclosure policy.  
 
Policy Level Accountability 
 
                                                 
17 The ten safeguard policies are: OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.04 Natural Habitats, OP 4.09 
Pest Management, OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement, OD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples, OP 4.36 Forestry, OP/BP 
4.37 Safety of Dams, OPN 11.03 Cultural Property, OP/BP 7.50 Projects on International Waterways, OP/BP 7.60 
Projects in Disputed Areas. For all safeguard policies, see http://go.worldbank.org/WTA1ODE7T0  
18 The private sector arm of the Bank includes the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (IFC and MIGA).   
19 See also www.cao-ombudsman.org and www.inspectionpanel.org. The  relative advantages of these two 
mechanisms for enabling accountability — the highly visible and independent nature of the IP process, as compared 
to the more agile and lower key approach of the CAO — have not been systematically examined. 
20 For an analysis of the IFC’s review of its safeguards, see Bank Information Center (2007) and Halifax Initiative 
Coalition (2006). For a listing of concerns on the weakening of IBRD safeguards as a result of the Bank’s Country 
Systems Approach, see Bank Information Center (2004). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  11 
During  the  tenure  of  World  Bank  president  James  D.  Wolfensohn  from  1995-2005,  the 
institution revised several of its most important environmental and social safeguard policies, 
including  those  on  resettlement,  indigenous  peoples,  and  forests.  It  also  conducted  strategic 
reviews  of  some  of  its  most  controversial  lending  practices—including  structural  adjustment 
lending  and  support  for  extractive industry  and  large  dam  projects.  Each  of  these  processes 
included a significant public consultation component. This reflects the World Bank’s recognition 
that  these  review  processes  would  not  be  considered  to  be  legitimate  or  methodologically 
rigorous unless they included the perspectives of affected stakeholders (Sherman 2001: 4). This 
was an important advance over its approach in earlier generations of policy revisions, in which 
transparency and public input were far more circumscribed.  
 
A number of these engagements were largely ad hoc in the sense that there were no formal 
protocols or guidelines for the design of the policy reviews. Moreover, many of the consultations 
suffered from a common set of problems: lack of clear objectives, mismatches in expectations 
between  the  Bank  and  civil  society  groups,  and  an  eventual  distancing  (and  in  some  cases 
rejection) by the Bank of recommendations emerging from those policy reviews. The resulting 
accountability regime can thus be described as consultative in the sense that civil society inputs 
were invited, but the degree to which they actually impacted the Bank’s final decisions remains 
unclear.  
 
The consultations with civil society did, however, result in the identification of two feedback 
mechanisms  as  being  especially  important,  though  not  uniformly  employed,  for  purposes  of 
accountability.  The  first  involved  the  distribution  of  iterative  drafts  of  policy  revisions  for 
comment prior to board review. When employed, this mechanism allowed participants a chance 
to comment on how their inputs would be incorporated before final decisions were taken.
21 The 
second mechanism was a matrix that compiled all comments and explained how each input was 
addressed in the policy revision, or why it was not accepted. This mechanism, which was used 
by the Bank in developing its “Issues and Options” paper for improving relations with civil 
society,  appeared to  be  gaining  greater currency  within  the  Bank  towards  the end  of  James 
Wolfensohn’s tenure (World Bank 2005b: 50). However, as discussed further below, participants 
in  these  policy  level  engagements  showed  significant  signs  of  fatigue  towards  the  end  of 
Wolfensohn’s presidency, largely because of disillusionment on the part of both civil society 
groups  and  Bank  staff  with  the  results  of  the  consultations.  This  frustration  arose  from  the 
Bank’s inability to manage the process — leading to unrealistic expectations on the part of CSOs 
as well as its own staff — and a failure to strategically integrate the consultations with an agenda 
for reform that it could reasonably take to the Board. 
 
Bank staff point to the more recent global consultations, on its governance and anti-corruption 
strategy, as indicative of a much improved consultation process that has incorporated lessons 
learned from the past including, for example: posting background documents and consultation 
schedules on the web, translating documents into five languages, giving CSOs sufficient lead 
time  to  prepare,  inviting  prominent  CSOs  such  as  Transparency  International  to  co-host 
                                                 
21 IFC’s reluctance to produce such an “indicative draft” prior to Board review was a source of significant frustration 
in its Safeguards Policy review (Bank Information Center 2004b). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  12 
meetings, and summarizing and posting feedback received.
22 This experience also indicates that 
many  civil  society  organizations  continue  to  engage  the  Bank  despite  frustrations  with  past 
processes.  
 
However, there are at least two reasons for avoiding reading too much into the anti-corruption 
consultations. First, in its own documentation of the consultation process, the World Bank notes 
that the consultation was described by several groups as rushed, particularly at the early stages, 
although it has also raised expectations that a more thorough process would follow (World Bank 
2006b). Second, and more important, the anti-corruption consultations centered only on a very 
general  strategy  document  which  lacked  specificity  with  respect  to  Bank  policies  or 
implementation. These  consultations  are  thus  not  easily  comparable  to  earlier  dialogues  that 
focused on more specific policy development. A more comparable test will arise in the Bank’s 
next  review  of  its  information  disclosure  policy.  Civil  society  groups  that  submitted  written 
comments to the anti-corruption strategy were very clear about this difference:  
 
While  we  recognize  that  the  focus  at  this  stage  of  the  process  is  still  on  collecting 
feedback on the strategy paper itself, we observe that there is little specificity in the 
proposed work plan. . . . [A]s external stakeholders, we do not have a clear sense of how 
practice within Bank Group operations will be evolving. It would be very helpful for the 
Bank to publicly share a more detailed update on the process by which implementation of 
the strategy will proceed, and identify clear opportunities for external stakeholders to 
contribute. (World Resources Institute Undated) 
 
Other groups were harder hitting, pushing either for more clarity on the process, or urging the 
Bank  to  address  corruption  by  adopting  the  recommendations  of  previous  consultative 
experiences: “Although the strategy acknowledges the importance of participation, this principal 
has  not been consistently reflected either in the priorities specific in the framework or in the  
formulation of the framework itself; . . . the framework should explicitly lay out consultation 
principles  and  strategy  for    engagement  with  key  external  stakeholders  (emphasis  in  the 
original);” (Bank Information Center 2007) and “the Bank could lead on this by acting on the 
recommendations  of  the  recent  Extractive  Industry  Review” (Parliamentary  Network  on  The 
World Bank Undated).  
 
Board Level Accountability 
 
Civil society organizations have also sought to increase accountability in the World Bank’s 
formal governance — its boards. The governance structure of the Bank is based upon a corporate 
model, in which member government shareholders are represented by a Board of Governors. The 
Governors meet once a year, and delegate responsibility for supervising day to day operations to 
a Board of Executive Directors (commonly referred to as the board). Voting power on these 
boards is apportioned based on member governments’ ownership share in the institution. Public 
voice and accountability is secured indirectly through state representation. In principle, 
management and staff are accountable to the member states through their board representatives, 
who, in turn, are accountable to their citizens. At face value, this structure appears to enable 
                                                 
22 For details, see http://go.worldbank.org/APQ5N1BF30. The consultations were held in late 2006 and early 2007 in 
37 developing countries and 12 donor countries, with about 3200 participants in total.  Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  13 
formal “upward” accountability to owner governments as well as “downward” accountability to 
their citizens, with greater accountability to those with the greatest financial investment in the 
institution. On the basis of this representational legitimacy, country governments and board 
members have sometimes chided civil society protesters with the critique “Whom do you 
represent?” 
 
The World Bank’s governance model has, however, been widely criticized as being inconsistent 
with the basic tenets of democratic and accountable decision-making. Many critics, including 
governments, civil society organizations, other international institutions, academics and Bank 
staff have observed that the Bank is not sufficiently representative, transparent, open to public 
participation, or accountable to those who are affected by its operations.
23 We outline only a 
handful  of  the  major  critiques  here.  The  nature  of  accountability  at  the  board  level  can  be 
characterized as a global capital regime, largely because of the dominance of nation-states or 
blocks with large economies (i.e., the lending governments) over poorer nations that are the most 
affected  by  Bank  operations  (i.e.,  the  borrowing  governments),  and  the  disproportionate 
influence of finance ministries coupled with the near-absence of scrutiny by elected parliaments.  
It should be noted at the outset that governance reform is probably the most “unsuccessful” arena 
in terms of civil society efforts to increase World Bank accountability.  
 
The most commonly raised concerns about governance concern the disproportionate allocation 
of voting shares to donor countries on the Governing Board, and the inequitable allocation of 
seats  on  the  Executive  Board.  Although  the  World  Bank  has  185  member  countries,  voting 
shares  are  apportioned  to  each  member  country  roughly  in  accordance  with  the  size  of  its 
economy.
24  This  weighted  voting  system  decidedly  favors  the  major  donor  governments, 
particularly the United States. The G-7 countries control nearly 43 percent of the voting shares, 
with the United States alone controlling about 16.4 percent.
25  Meanwhile, the voting rights of 
many poor borrowing countries are so small as to be essentially symbolic. For example, the 46 
sub-Saharan African countries have a combined voting share of only between 5 to 6 percent. 
This  voting  arrangement  is  problematic  from  the  perspective  of  fair  and  democratic 
representation,  because  it  disenfranchises  those  with  the  greatest  interest  in  Board  decision-
making – i.e., the poorest countries that are most affected by Bank decisions have the least voice 
(Griffith-Jones undated; Nye et al. 2003: 67-68; United Nations 2005: 72). 
 
This  problem  is  compounded  by  the  inequitable  allocation  of  Executive  Director  seats.  The 
Board is comprised of only 24 Executive Directors to represent all 185 member countries. This 
means that many countries must share representation. Eight of the most powerful countries are 
represented by their own Executive Directors, while the remaining 177 countries are grouped 
into  16  constituencies  of  4-24  countries  each.
26  These  “constituent”  executive  directors  are 
typically appointed for only two-year terms, thus creating incentives for them to represent the 
interests of their own country rather than the multiple countries they represent, particularly where 
                                                 
23 See, for example UNDP (2002: 112); Calieri and Schroeder (2003: 4); Bretton Woods Project (2003);
 and Woods 
(2003: 2).
 
24 In reality, the formula for allocating voting shares underestimates the size of developing economies, and therefore 
affords them even less opportunity to influence decision-making. 
25 Based upon voting shares at the IBRD. These figures are published in the financial statements section of the 
World Bank’s annual report. See World Bank (2007: 57-61). 
26 These are the United States, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, Saudi Arabia and China. Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  14 
those  interests  are  diverse.
27  Thus,  the  Executive  Director  that  represents  24  sub-Saharan 
countries for a two-year period can not possibly be as effective for all these countries as the 
United States Executive Director, who represents one country, and is appointed for an indefinite 
term. Moreover, those constituencies that include both donor and borrowing countries are almost 
always represented by an official from a donor country (Calieri and Schroeder 2003: 4).
28 
 
This disparity in voting power between developed and developing countries creates a substantial 
moral hazard problem — since the donor countries that wield the most voting power do not 
borrow from the Bank, they are not accountable to citizens who bear the risks of their decisions 
(Bradlow 2001: 18).
29 The separation of decision-making power from political accountability 
allows  donor  governments  to  govern  the  institution  in  accordance  with  their  own  domestic 
political interests. As Ann Florini has observed, “[g]overnments, answerable only to domestic 
electorates, face few incentives to act for the benefit of someone else’s constituency” (Florini 
2003: 14). Notably, the heads of state that gathered in Monterrey in 2002 to address the problems 
of  development  finance  stressed  “…the  need  to  broaden  and  strengthen  the  participation  of 
developing countries and economies in transition in international economic decision-making and 
norm  setting,”  and  specifically  called  on  the  World  Bank  to  enhance  participation  of  all 
developing and transition countries in their governance (United Nations 2003: para 62).  
 
Yet the problems of accountability to citizens in borrowing countries is more complicated than 
simply increasing the voting power of developing countries. Arguably, borrowing countries have 
less of an incentive than donor countries to increase transparency and disclosure practices or to 
strengthen social and environmental safeguards. It is the developing country members on the 
Bank’s board that have tended to oppose reforms on issues such as gender equity, environment, 
participation and anti-corruption.  The problem of board voting is thus not just about increasing 
the influence of developing country governments, but also about increasing accountability to 
citizens in those countries who are affected by their decisions. 
 
Accountability  to  affected  citizens  is  also  undermined  by  weaknesses  in  transparency  about 
board deliberations, and an absence of mechanisms for linking citizens in borrowing countries to 
executive directors. For most of the world’s citizens, the chances of holding their representatives 
accountable are small. For one thing, public accountability of executive directors is significantly 
impaired by board secrecy.
30 But even if board deliberations were more transparent, it would still 
be  difficult  for  citizens  to  determine  how  they  were  being  represented,  since  decisions  are 
                                                 
27 The expression was used by the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. Lawrence Summers, Remarks to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Export/Trade Promotion, January 27, 
1999.  
28 For example, all Eastern European borrowing countries are represented by a Western European Executive 
Director. 
29 While the board’s work is mostly done by consensus rather than by vote, a cynical interpretation of this practice is that it serves 
as a cover to insulate board members from accountability to citizens they claim to represent. When votes are taken, they are 
typically kept secret.  
30 Transcripts of meetings and summaries of Board discussions are not made public.Changes to the disclosure policy in 2005, 
however, allow for names of Executive Directors who wish to be recorded as abstaining from a vote or objecting (and 
thus the names of those who supported a decision may be inferred). They also allow Board minutes to be disclosed 
after approval by the Board, but members can redact any material prior to release. See World Bank (2005e: 4). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  15 
usually  made  by  consensus  without  formal  votes  being  taken.
31  Thus  while  the  board  does 
actually  make  minutes  of  its  meetings  available,  these  are  sanitized  documents  –  neither 
transcripts of discussions nor voting records are typically available. While individual directors 
are free to explain to their constituencies how they voted and why, few are required or choose to 
do so on a routine basis. Since votes are usually not taken, and since records of those votes and 
the deliberations that preceded them are not publicized, citizens simply do not know how their 
executive directors are representing them. Without this basic information, citizens have no way 
to  hold  their  executive  directors  to  account  (Calieri  and  Schroeder  2003).  Finally,  there  is 
nothing that citizens in one country can reasonably do to hold an executive director from another 
country accountable for his or her actions, despite that fact that the decisions of directors directly 
impact countries other than their own. 
 
Representatives of borrowing governments are further disadvantaged by the balance of power 
between management and the executive directors. They often lack the kind of analytical support 
from parent ministries that helps donor Executive Directors to stay on top of the complex issues 
before them. Moreover, because Executive Directors that represent constituencies are rotated 
frequently, they have little time to master the issues before they are replaced. These Executive 
Directors are further disadvantaged by the widespread perception that Board approval is merely a 
ratification of decisions that have already been made by management in consultation with most 
powerful  members,  and  that  efforts  to  exercise  influence  are  therefore  essentially  futile 
(IMF1999; Woods 2003). This is exacerbated by the fact that management and staff seldom 
divulge internal policy disagreements to the board, preferring instead to present a unified front in 
board discussions. As a result, the board is deprived of the opportunity to participate in these 
debates, or to hear and consider the alternative views of those whose arguments did not prevail 
within the organization. 
 
In  addition,  representation  of  affected  people  is  compromised  by  the  fact  that  finance  and 
development ministries of member states dominate decision-making. Although the World Bank 
is supposed to be the agent of its member states, it is in effect administered by a “club” of 
officials that represent only a narrow spectrum of the political apparatus of its member states—
the finance and development ministries (Keohane and Nye 2001). Thus, the Bank is governed by 
“parts of governments working with similar parts of other governments,” but excluding other, 
more  democratically  responsive,  parts  of  their  own  governments  (Nye  et  al.  2003:  4).
32 
Representation by narrow and relatively unaccountable departments of the government raises 
serious  questions  about  whether  the  broader  public  interest,  or  the  interests  of  other 
constituencies are being adequately represented. In particular, citizens concerned about issues 
that have little to do with the authority or expertise of the finance ministries—such as poverty 
reduction, health care, human rights, gender equality or the environment—are not likely to enjoy 
responsive and accountable representation through this arrangement. 
 
                                                 
31 While consensus decision-making would appear at first blush to neutralize the differences in voting power 
between the Directors, in practice it reinforces them without requiring that power to be explicitly invoked. 
Consensus does not require unanimity, but reflects the Chairman’s “sense of the meeting,” which is determined by 
the voting power of those who express their support or opposition to a given outcome (Birdsall 2003). 
32While this problem may originate at the country level, with ministries of finance typically hold more power than others, it is 
reproduced and strengthened in global institutions where these ministries are accorded privileged positions.  Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  16 
A related and more significant problem is that the role of national parliaments in overseeing the 
behavior of directors is generally very weak. Legislators usually have only limited access to 
critical documents about World Bank and IMF operations in their own countries. Rather, key 
decisions have typically been made by the finance and development ministries (along with the 
World  Bank  and  IMF),  with  only  limited  parliamentary  participation  and  oversight (Halifax 
Initiative et al.,2004: 4). The independent Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) 
has  recommended  that  the  World  Bank  Executive  Board  refrain  from  approving  certain 
documents (such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers required of heavily indebted poor 
countries) unless they have been reviewed by the national parliament (Rowden and Irama 2004: 
39). The Bank has maintained that such a requirement would violate its Articles of Agreement, 
which prevents it from interfering in the political affairs of any member country (World Bank 
2005d).
33  Many  parliamentarians  counter  that  the  Bank’s  focus  on  finance  ministries  as  the 
fulcrum of fiscal and development policy making is itself political interference, insofar as it 
tends  to  alter  the  balance  of  power  between  the  ministries  and  parliament  (ActionAid 
International et al. 2005). 
 
In democratic nation-states, governments typically bolster public accountability through a rubric 
of institutional checks and balances in which certain branches or agencies of government are 
empowered  to  oversee  and  sanction  others.  No  such  “horizontal”  mechanisms  exist  at  the 
international level to constrain Bank decision-making by force of law or threat of sanction.
 34 
Each  of  the  potential  mechanisms  of  horizontal  accountability—the  United  Nations,  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  and  international  human  rights  courts  and  tribunals—is 
inadequate. Of these, the United Nations would appear to be the most promising, since the Bank 
is a Specialized Agency of the UN. However, the Relationship Agreement between the UN and 
the Bank specifically precludes the UN from involvement in the Bank’s discretionary decision-
making with respect to its lending operations.
35 The ICJ is also unavailable as an accountability 
mechanism because only states can bring cases before it.
36 Moreover, the Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement  preclude  member  states  from  bringing  legal  action  against  the  Bank.
37  Finally, 
international  human  rights  law  as  applied  by  courts  and  tribunals  has  so  far  proved  equally 
unavailing.  The  Bank  has  argued  that  its  Charter  prohibition  on  interfering  in  the  “political 
affairs”  of  its  member  countries  limits  how  it  can  consider  international  human  rights 
conventions  (Shihata  1991;  1992).  While  civil  society  and  academic  observers  have  sharply 
criticized this argument, and the Bank may be rethinking this position, no court has yet addressed 
the parameters of the Bank’s human rights obligations.
  
 
Finally, questions on the accountability of the Bank’s president have received extensive public 
attention in the lead up to the resignation of Paul Wolfowitz in May of 2007. While the media 
hype and board deliberations centered primarily on whether the president abused the powers of 
his office in arranging a pay and promotion package for his partner, Shaha Ali Riza,  a much 
                                                 
33 The problem appears to be more at the executive level than the staff or management level, with the latter 
increasingly engaging parliamentarians with the PNoWB. 
34 See, for example, (Goetz and Jenkins 2002: 7; Grant and Keohane 2005; Oloka-Onyango and Udagama 2001). 
35 Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), art. IV(3) 16 
U.N.T.S 346 (1948).  
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1) (1945).  
37 IBRD, Articles of Agreement, art VII(3). World Bank loan and credit agreements do include arbitration provisions, but they 
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more significant issue of public accountability has received considerably less attention — the 
presidential  selection  process.  The  former  is  a  professional  (staff-level)  accountability  issue, 
while  the  latter  concerns  governance-level  accountability.  The  accountability  of  the  Bank’s 
president to the board and to citizens of member governments is severely diluted by the United 
States’  prerogative  to  name  the  Bank’s  president.  The  informal  arrangement  in  which  the 
president  is  selected  by,  and  therefore  accountable  to,  the  United  States  greatly  enhances 
American power within the institution, while undermining the authority of the board (Kapur 
2002:  60).
38  Because  the  president  has  considerable  discretion  in  shaping  the  institution’s 
agenda, rules and processes, the United States’ prerogative to name the president means that it 
actually wields much greater power than its voting shares would suggest. This prerogative has 
been  widely  derided  as  being  impossible  to  reconcile  with  basic  principles  democratic 
governance  (Bapna  and  Reisch  2005;  Bretton  Woods  Project  2003;  IFI  Democracy 
Coalition2005; UNDP2002). Thus, in 2001, a joint World Bank-IMF working group called for a 
meritocratic selection process open to qualified candidates of any nationality (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund 2001). A number of civil society groups have long been pushing for 
reforms guided by two basic accountability principles: transparency of process, and competence 
of prospective leadership without regard to national origin.
39 In an unprecedented action, nearly 
one hundred current and retired Bank staff, including some vice presidents, signed a letter issued 
by civil society calling for reform. The chorus of change was joined by statements by the finance 
ministers  of  Australia,  Brazil  and  South  Africa,  as  well  as  by  several  U.S.  congressmen 
(Goodman 2007). 
 
In the end, these unprecedented calls for opening up the presidential selection process did not 
affect  how  the  current  president,  Robert  Zoellick,  was  selected.  The  U.S.  is  not  about  to 
relinquish its prerogative to name the president, and nor are the Europeans likely to give up  
theirs at the IMF. But the current president’s legitimacy, like that of his predecessor, continues to 
be questioned by many civil society groups, and even by some member states and Bank staff — 
regardless of his qualifications for the position. This reinforces two fundamental challenges of 
democratic  accountability  facing  global  public  institutions.  The  first  is  that  problems  of 
legitimacy  (how  the  president is  selected)  matter  as  much  as  problems  of  effectiveness  (the 
president’s  abilities  to  run  the  institution).  The  second  is  that  the  global  capital  regime, 
characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of wealthy states, 
continues to dominate the most important governance decisions in the World Bank. 
 
In sum, the challenges of accountability at the level of board governance are the most daunting 
because  the  very  foundations  of  governance  —  vote  allocation  proportionate  to  economy, 
representation by finance ministries, absence of parliamentary scrutiny, the US prerogative in 
presidential selection, and the relative voicelessness of the poorest and most affected actors  — 
are at odds with fundamental premises of democratic decision making and accountability. This is 
also the arena in which civil society efforts for reform have had the least impact.  
                                                 
38 While the US does not have a de jure right to have its nominee approved, and the process allows for anyone to be nominated by 
a member country, this is meaningless given the lack of political will in the US and Europe to give up their arrangements of 
“tradition.” 
39 See, for example, a statement on “Leadership Selection Reform at the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund” issued by the New Rules for Global Finance coalition in May 2007, with 676 signatories (www.new-
rules.org/docs/imf_wb_leadership_selection051107.htm). Also see  a letter signed by over 180 CSOs just prior to 
Wolfowitz’s resignation demanding a “broader governance overhaul” (www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3289.aspx). Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  18 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS AT THE POLICY AND PROJECT LEVELS 
 
In the final third of this paper, we return to a closer examination of two types of engagements 
between the World Bank and civil society groups: a) consultations with civil society during 
reviews of major Bank policies concerning social safeguards, structural adjustment, and lending 
for large dams and extractive industries; and, b) participation by citizens and civil society groups 
in  Bank  projects  and  operations.  We  do  not  discuss  further  the  staff  and  board  level 
accountability challenges due to the comparatively limited civil society efforts and successes in 
those arenas. 
 
Our aim below is to explore whether civil society engagements have led to changes in Bank 
policy and practice with respect to downward accountability to citizens and civil society groups.  
The description below is a summary of a more detailed report (seeHerz and Ebrahim 2005). It is 
important to note that this discussion refers only to civil society organizations that have chosen 
to engage in dialogue with the Bank in order to influence it. 
40 
 
Civil Society Efforts to Influence Bank Policies 
 
 
Civil society efforts to influence internal Bank policies can be traced back to at least the early 
1980s, and are credited with a number of significant successes. In about 1983, a group of very 
large  membership-based  advocacy  NGOs  based  in  Washington  DC  began  lobbying  their 
members of Congress and the US Treasury to reform the Bank’s environmental practices. Their 
efforts, combined with those of others inside and outside the Bank, contributed to the eventual 
creation of an Environment Department in the institution in 1987, and the formalization of an 
environmental assessment policy in 1989. These early successes helped build momentum on 
Bank advocacy and reform by a range of CSOs throughout the North and South. A growing 
number  of civil  society actors around  the  world  thus  began  pushing  for  better disclosure  of 
information  by  the  Bank,  and  the  establishment  of  an  independent  complaints  mechanism, 
eventually leading to the formation of  the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1994.
41 
 
Around  the  same  time,  innovators  within  the  World  Bank,  began  to  look  for    more  formal 
mechanisms through which to engage NGOs.
42 An NGO-World Bank Committee, comprised of 
NGO leaders as well as Bank staff, was formed in 1981. The NGO members of this committee,  
largely  from  the  South,  established an  autonomous  Working  Group  in  1984  to  develop  and 
coordinate their advocacy agendas. Throughout the 1990s, they were especially influential in 
building internal Bank support for a “participation” agenda, and pushed heavily for including 
Southern voices in the shaping of policies and projects. Their successes were numerous: the 
                                                 
40 As noted earlier in the paper, there are many organizations which choose, on grounds of principle, not to dialogue 
with the Bank and to opt for mechanisms of engagement that are more adversarial in nature. While such 
organizations play crucial roles in building external pressure for Bank reform, their impacts are more difficult to 
assess. 
41 Detailed accounts of these civil society advances are provided in a number of sources and are thus not repeated 
here (e.g., Clark, Fox and Treakle 2003; Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Long 2001). 
42 This historical summary draws heavily on Carolyn Long (2001), chapter 2. Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  19 
creation of a formal NGO unit within the strategic planning division of the Bank, the launching 
of  two  important  World  Bank  workshops  on  participation,  the  creation  of  a  World  Bank 
“Learning Group on Popular Participation”  to analyze and build Bank capacity for participation 
in projects, and an ambitious effort to independently monitor the Bank’s policies and projects 
with respect to participation.  
 
But  the  Working  Group’s  most  important  achievements  were  political  and cultural:  building 
legitimacy for civil society and citizen participation in a technocratic organization. These efforts 
were backed up by resources developed within the Bank — a Participation Sourcebook in 1996, 
and Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques in 1998 (Rietbergen-McCracken 
and Narayan 1998; World Bank 1996). The push for participation and engagement with NGOs 
received a further shot in the arm with appointment James Wolfensohn as Bank president in 
1995,  who  created  the  new  position  of  “NGO  liaison  officer”  in  the  organization’s  country 
offices. By the year 2001, there were at 70 such officers in the Bank’s ninety resident missions, 
and 120 worldwide by 2007, supported by two units at headquarters: the Civil Society Team and 
the  Participation  and  Civic  Engagement  Team  (based,  respectively,  in  the  External  Affairs 
Department  and  Sustainable  Development  Network  in  the  organization  chart  in  Figure  1). 
However, even while all of this progress was being made, an analysis of the Working Group’s 
experience pointed to a key concern: Bank efforts to implement participation were “half-hearted 
at best, and have not come close to reaching the goal of fully incorporating participation into its 
operations” partly due to the lack of an organizational strategy for doing so, thus  leading to ad 
hoc  efforts  without  adequate  political  or  management  support  (Long  2001:  56).  While  that 
observation was made in the late 1990s, it remains true nearly a decade later. 
 
In the decade commencing 1997, the Bank revised several of its most important environmental 
and social safeguard policies, and conducted strategic reviews of some of its most controversial 
lending practices. Each of these processes included a significant public consultation component, 
reflecting the World Bank’s recognition that the legitimacy of these processes depends on a 
semblance  of  public  accountability  through  the  inclusion  of  the  perspectives  of  affected 
stakeholders (Sherman 2001: 4). However, the structural problems faced by the Working Group 
continued to plague these efforts too. Because the Bank does not have clear and mandatory 
protocols  for  designing  consultative  processes,  it  created  mechanisms  on  an  ad  hoc  basis. 
Consultative efforts undertaken between 1997 and 2005 employed three different approaches to 
evaluating  and  revising  global  policies  and  strategies—unilateral,  independent,  and 
collaborative. These approaches differed in the extent to which the Bank retained the authority to 
structure the nature and timing of the public consultation process and to evaluate public inputs. 
In all three approaches, the Bank remained the final arbiter of how those inputs were to influence 
policy outcomes. 
 
In the unilateral approach, public consultations are almost entirely Bank-structured. Bank staff 
devise the format and timing of public inputs, convene the public consultations, and evaluate 
public inputs. This mechanism is by far the most common, and most of the policy revision 
processes, including the Forestry, Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples, and IFC Safeguards policy 
reviews, and consultations around the Country Systems proposal, employed this approach. By 
contrast,  the  independent  approach  relies  upon  external  experts  or  stakeholders  to  drive  the 
process  and  formulate  recommendations.  In  the  World  Commission  on  Dams  (WCD),  for Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  20 
example, the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) established an independent 
panel  of  civil  society,  government,  and  industry  experts  to  conduct  a  global  review  of 
development effectiveness of large dams (WCD 2000).
43 Similarly, in the Extractive Industries 
Review (EIR), the Bank commissioned an “Eminent Person” to conduct an external review of 
the development impacts of the Bank’s project and policy interventions in extractive industries 
(Extractive Industries Review 2003). Under the collaborative approach, the Bank and its key 
stakeholders  share  responsibility  in  structuring  the  review  and  assessing  its  outcomes.  For 
example, the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) was conceived as a 
collaborative  review,  in  which  the  World  Bank,  civil  society  organizations,  and  government 
officials would agree upon research approaches and participation procedures, and jointly assess 
the impacts of structural adjustment (SAPRIN2004). 
 
Despite these improvements in access, many civil society organizations noted significant 
shortfalls in the policy dialogues. Many CSOs complained that their most important concerns 
were not adequately considered or addressed in these reviews. Civil society concerns were 
subordinated in different ways in each type of policy review process. CSOs generally gave the 
independent and collaborative reviews high marks for considering their priorities and for 
developing policy recommendations that thoughtfully addressed them.
44 Yet in each case, many  
CSOs felt that the Bank failed to adjust significantly its policy framework in response to the 
review’s findings or recommendations. For example, the Bank refused to commit to the WCD 
guidelines for developing large dam projects, agreeing instead only to assist governments and 
project developers to “test” the recommendations in their projects (World Bank 2001c). 
Similarly, according to key civil society actors involved in the process, the Bank ended its 
involvement in the SAPRI review after accepting much of the background research in the 
review, but without revising its policies in accordance with the findings (SAPRIN2002: 23-24). 
For its part, the Bank maintains that the findings of the SAPRI review did influence its approach 
to poverty and social impact assessment, its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process, and its 
revised policy on Development Policy Lending (World Bank 2005f: 3). Finally, while civil 
society groups believed that the Eminent Person’s recommendations in the EIR broadly reflected 
their concerns, civil society groups claim that the Bank agreed to adopt only a limited set of 
second-order or diluted recommendations.
45 Here too, the Bank claims that it adopted over 
eighty percent of the recommendations of the EIR. The unilateral policy revisions also displayed 
a similar divide, with many civil society organizations objecting that, far from addressing their 
most pressing concerns, the Bank used the opportunity to lower the standards embodied in the 
existing policy.
46  
                                                 
43 Although the WCD was not limited in its mandate to World Bank projects or policies, it is relevant here because it grew out of 
concern with World Bank support of large dam projects, was commissioned in part by the Bank, and was widely expected by 
participants to inform the World Bank’s support for large dams going forward. 
44 For civil society reactions to the WCD see (Dubash et al. 2001; Herz and Ebrahim 2005: Appendix F; Imhof, 
Wong and Bosshard 2002). For civil society reactions to the EIR see BIC (2004a). More generally, see Lawrence 
(2005). 
45 See, the Forest People’s Programme submission to World Bank-Civil Society Joint Facilitation Committee, in 
Herz and Ebrahim (2005: Appendix F, pp. 6, 12).  
46 See, for example: a letter from 113 NGOs from 35 countries to the World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, 
Dec 10, 1997 (on forest policy); a letter from the  Center for International Environmental Law and International 
Rivers Network on behalf of 158 other organizations and individuals to James Wolfensohn, February 21, 2001,  
available at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/wbresttleletter.html (on resettlement policy); a letter from 186 international civil 
society organizations to Executive Directors regarding World Bank Safeguard Policies (Country systems) available Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  21 
 
The conflicting perspectives in these diverse policy reviews point to two common problems: the 
Bank’s lack of follow through with civil society groups in how it actually uses reviews for 
changing its policies and practices; and an inability to use the review process to set and agree on 
achievable goals and priorities.  Civil society groups involved in these reviews suggested that the 
Bank rarely articulates what it hopes to achieve from a proposed consultative process. It seldom 
clarifies which issues are, and are not, open for consideration, or what policy options are 
“politically feasible.” Bank staff involved in the reviews suggest that civil society groups enter 
the process with unrealistic expectations. This has been a particular issue in “collaborative” and 
“independent” reviews, in which there is greater latitude for deliberations and recommendations 
to depart from established Bank orthodoxies. For example, the outcomes of the WCD and SAPRI 
appear to have so thoroughly transgressed the unspoken boundaries of political feasibility that 
the Bank distanced itself from the processes and refused to explicitly adopt their conclusions or 
recommendations.
47 The EIR also appears to have exceeded its political constraints in similar, 
but more limited ways. In the EIR, civil society participants and the independent Eminent Person 
believed that the review was to consider the threshold question of whether extractive industries 
investments were an appropriate vehicle for achieving the Bank’s mission of poverty alleviation 
through sustainable development (EIR2003: 3). The Bank, however, was only prepared to 
consider a narrower set of recommendations on how to improve existing operations. As a result, 
the Eminent Person’s recommendation that the Bank phase out certain operations was rejected 
by both management and the Board (BIC et al.2004). 
 
On the issue of legitimacy, limited civil society participation in the design of these reviews 
caused them to get bogged down in disputes over process. Global policy reviews have almost 
invariably begun with an imbroglio between civil society and the Bank over the structure and 
process  of  the  review,  for  two  interrelated  reasons.  First,  since  the  Bank  has  no  mandatory 
requirements for whether, or how to, conduct a consultative process, the terms of engagement 
must  be  re-established  each  time.  Second,  although  the  Bank’s  Consultation  Guidelines 
recognize  that  civil  society  organizations  should  have  a  role  in  designing  the  consultation 
process,  the  Bank  has  rarely  tried  to  develop  the  framework  for  a  given  consultation  in  a 
collaborative way (World Bank 2000a). In the absence of rules that provide minimum procedural 
guarantees  or  negotiated  agreements  on  acceptable  mechanisms,  process  fights  are  all  but 
inevitable.  
 
The design of consultations has been particularly contentious in processes in which the Bank has 
taken a unilateral approach. For example, many civil society organizations boycotted the first 
stage  of  IFC’s  Safeguard  Policy  review  because  they  believed  that  the  duration  of  the 
consultation period and the lack of clarity on how feedback on drafts would be provided and 
incorporated  foreclosed  meaningful  opportunities  to  influence  outcomes.
48  Similarly,  the 
Resettlement  and  Indigenous  Peoples  policy  revision  processes  both  began  with  protracted 
                                                                                                                                                             
at http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/safeguard_policies_at_the_world_bank/1469.php; and an analysis on the 
weakening of safeguards by BIC and CIEL (2004). 
47 See, for example, a letter from Former Commissioners of World Commission on Dams to President James 
Wolfensohn, dated July 12, 2002, available at www.irn.org/wcd/021008.wbletter.pdf ; also see SAPRIN (2002: 23-
25) and World Bank (2005b: 17). 
48 See various civil society statements available under the heading “IFC Letters and Statements” at www.grrr-
now.org or at www.grrr-now.org/?action=showposts&id=456.  Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  22 
disputes over procedural issues such as whether there would be public consultations, how they 
would be structured, and how long the consultation process would last. The Bank made limited 
efforts to include civil society perspectives into the structure of the Forest Policy review, by 
inviting one civil society organization to assist in designing the consultation process. However, 
this  approach  also  resulted  in  controversy.  Many  organizations  objected  that  it  was  not 
sufficiently  inclusive,  and  that  it  set  up  the  assisting  organization  to  play  an  inappropriate 
gatekeeper role in the process. These concerns took six months to resolve (Sherman 2001: 7).  
 
Independent reviews have not been immune to such controversies. There, the question has been 
whether the external reviewers would be sufficiently balanced and independent of the Bank to 
ensure a fair process. For example, in the multi-stakeholder negotiations around the creation of 
the WCD, the question of whether dam-affected people would be represented on the commission 
was highly contentious and nearly led to the collapse of the discussions (Herz and Ebrahim 2005: 
Appendix  F,  pp.  9-10;  Imhof,  Wong  and  Bosshard  2002:  6).  In  the  EIR,  civil  society 
organizations had no voice in the threshold decision of who would lead the review. While they 
did not seriously challenge this exclusion, they did raise a set of concerns about whether the 
Eminent Person and his staff would have sufficient independence from the Bank. It was only 
after the Eminent Person took affirmative action to assert his independence that civil society 
organizations decided not to renounce the process en masse. SAPRI may be the only process that 
avoided significant disputes over the initial structuring of the review process.
49 SAPRI’s success 
in  developing  a  work  plan  for  public  outreach  that  was  acceptable  to  all  stakeholders  is 
attributable to the fact that the principle of collaborative design was adopted at the outset of the 
SAPRI process. Here too, despite this promising start, substantial disagreements over ideology, 
methodology and conclusions developed over time, and the collaborative nature of the process 
ultimately degenerated into mutual distrust and recrimination. 
 
In linking the dual challenges of legitimacy and effectiveness, one of civil society organizations’ 
most  persistent  and  penetrating  complaints  has  been  that  the  Bank  seems  to  consider  the 
commitments  that  it  makes  to  stakeholders  during  the  course  of  its  policy  dialogues  to  be 
provisional. In particular, participants have expressed deep frustration with the Bank’s failure to 
follow through on commitments with respect to issues of overriding importance to them. Two 
examples  illustrate  the  problem.  First,  in  the  Indigenous  People’s  policy  review,  senior 
management  promised  indigenous  leaders  that  they  would  convene  a  “legal  roundtable,”  in 
which lawyers representing indigenous peoples and attorneys in the General Counsel’s office 
could discuss the Bank’s obligations to indigenous peoples under international law. The Bank, 
however, delayed acting on this commitment for a year and a half, and when the Bank finally did 
make its lawyers available, they refused to discuss the central question of Bank obligations under 
international law.
50 Second, in the Forest Policy review, there was a broad consensus among 
many stakeholders that the new Forest Policy should address the indirect impacts of adjustment 
and programmatic lending on forests.
51 Bank management declined to address the issue, assuring 
                                                 
49 The SAPRI Report explains that “a mutually respectful relationship developed between the SAPRIN Secretariat 
and the Bank counterpart, in its Policy Research Department that allowed the professional organization of the 
initiative during the project-preparation stage” (SAPRIN 2002: 23). 
50 See the Forest People’s Programme submission to the Joint Facilitation Committee, in (Herz and Ebrahim 2005: 
Appendix F, pp. 8, 13). 
51 See:  Letter from World Rainforest Movement, Forest Peoples Programme and Environmental Defense (USA), on 
behalf of 47 International NGOs to President James Wolfensohn June 28, 2004  Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  23 
civil society (and the Board) that these impacts would be addressed in the upcoming review of 
the structural adjustment policy. Specifically, management promised that it would revise the 
structural adjustment policy to include a “transparent mechanism for systematically addressing 
the environmental aspects, including in particular possible forestry impacts” (World Bank 2002d: 
4).  While  the  revised  policy  does  address  forest  impacts,  it  is  neither  transparent  nor 
systematic—it  fails  to  specify  minimum  standards  to  ensure  that  adequate  environmental 
assessments will be conducted, or that identified impacts will be mitigated (Jenkins and Gibbs 
Undated; World Bank 2004a: para 11).  
 
The problem of commitment is exacerbated by the observation that the Bank rarely provides 
adequate feedback to inform participants how their inputs have influenced policy development. 
Participants expect to be informed about how their inputs have influenced outcomes. Where 
contributions  are  not  adopted,  they  expect  clear  reasons  for  why  other  policy  options  were 
pursued.  Such  feedback  mechanisms  demonstrate  respect  for  participants,  introduce  greater 
transparency into decision-making, and provide assurances that inputs have been meaningfully 
considered.  However,  Bank  review  processes  have  not  consistently  utilized  feedback 
mechanisms to allow participants to understand how their insights and expertise have informed 
policy outcomes The Bank’s failure to explain how public inputs inform policy making feeds the 
widespread perception that public inputs do not have a significant influence on policy (World 
Bank 2005b: 16).  
 
In summary, it is difficult to underestimate the debilitating impact these policy experiences have 
had on the World Bank’s credibility as an institution that is willing to listen and learn from its 
constituents. Cynicism and disillusionment have flourished in the space between the promise of 
meaningful  participation  and  the  perception  of  minimal  influence.  For  many  civil  society 
organizations that repeatedly engage the World Bank on policy issues, these global consultative 
processes are iconic, and tend to define CSOs perceptions of whether their engagement in a 
proposed consultation process is likely to be useful or not. Thus, the decision of whether or not 
to  devote  organizational  resources  to  a  Bank  consultation  is  often  considered,  in  the  first 
instance, by reference to past negative experiences. The threshold question that those who are 
considering engagement in a World Bank policy consultation almost invariably ask is, “How will 
this process be any more productive than the WCD, the EIR, etc.?”  
 
Civil Society Efforts to Influence Bank Projects 
 
The World Bank’s project lending has often been a source of contention with civil society, with 
much  conflict  centering  on  issues  local  control,  participatory  decision-making,  and  project 
ownership.  The  Bank’s  own  literature  and  research  show  that  civil  society  participation  in 
projects significantly improves project design, quality of service, and public support (Rukuba-
Ngaiza et al.  2002:  14).  It  also  increases  transparency  and accountability  in contracting  and 
procurement, while improving relationships between citizens and their public agencies (World 
Bank  2002c).  Overall,  it  leads  to  better  outcomes,  lower  risks,  and  increased  development 
effectiveness (World Bank 2005b: 5-6, para 11, 13).  
                                                                                                                                                             
<www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/wb_8_6_ngo_let_jun04_eng.shtml>  ; Letter from 113 NGOs from 35 
countries to World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, Dec 10, 1997 
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In addition, the World Bank encourages its staff and borrowing governments to engage with civil 
society throughout the project cycle (World Bank 2000b). Since the early 1990s, the Bank has 
made some notable progress in improving participation in its projects. According to the Bank’ 
Independent Evaluation Group, stakeholder participation rose from 32 percent of new projects 
approved in 1990 to 72 percent in 2006 (World Bank 2006d: 23). Similarly, consultations in 
Environmental Assessments rose from about 50 percent in 1992 to 87 percent by 2001 (Rukuba-
Ngaiza et al. 2002). Modest qualitative gains are also apparent. In 1992, EA consultations were 
often limited to surveying affected groups and making the EA publicly available. By 1997, they 
included better use of public meetings, disclosure, and increased interaction between the Bank 
and stakeholders. And in 2006, Bank staff and partners were beginning to note the importance of 
improving information disclosure and increasing community access to participation at various 
stages of the project cycle (World Bank 1993; World Bank 1997; World Bank 2006a). 
 
The actual influence of civil society on Bank-supported projects, however, remains limited and 
uneven.  As  with  the  global  policy  reviews  discussed  above,  civil  society  efforts  to  improve 
accountability at the project level have been concerned with both effectiveness and legitimacy.   
 
A common civil society concerns about accountability at the project level centers on problems of 
transparency  and  disclosure  of  information.  The  World  Bank’s  Policy  on  Disclosure  of 
Information provides that “timely dissemination of information to local groups affected by the 
projects  and  programs  supported  by  the  Bank,  including  nongovernmental  organizations,  is 
essential for the effective implementation and sustainability of projects” (World Bank 2002e). 
However, the policy does not require the release of some materials that are critical for informed 
participation. It does not require the release of certain draft project documents, which would 
provide citizens with information while decisions are still under consideration. For example, the 
Bank’s Project Appraisal Document, which assesses the feasibility and justification for a project, 
is only made publicly available after financing for the project has been approved. Nor does the 
policy  require  the  disclosure  of  supervision  documents,  which  would  enable  civil  society  to 
better monitor implementation. In 2002, more than 500 organizations from over 100 countries 
called  on  the  Bank  to  make  such  information  public  during  its  review  of  its  information 
disclosure policy. And even where the disclosure policy requires documents to be made publicly 
available,  there  is  no  independent  review  mechanism  to  ensure  that  Bank  staff  respond 
appropriately  to  information  requests  (Saul  2003:  6-8).  The  failure  to  disclose  project 
information at a time when it can inform public participation has constrained the abilities of 
citizens and CSOs to assess the merits and potential impacts of proposed projects (Guttal and 
Shoemaker 2004; Lawrence 2004). Arguably, it has also undermined public acceptance of the 
Bank and its projects by creating an impression that the organization has something to hide.
52 
The Bank’s disclosure policy is slated to undergo a formal revision, with consultations expected 
in 2008. 
 
Another broad set of concerns focus on the Bank’s project cycle, and the opportunities for civil 
society groups to participate and to hold the organization to account during that cycle. First, 
citizen participation usually does not occur until the project preparation and appraisal stage of the 
cycle. The Bank does not require that borrowers solicit public inputs during the early stages of 
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needs  assessments  and  project  identification  and  design,  when  fundamental  decisions  about 
project type and risk are made, and when the full range of policy and project options can be 
considered. An OED review found that only 12 percent of sampled projects were participatory 
during project identification (World Bank 2000c: vi). A systemic bias against early consultation 
is also apparent in Environmental Assessments. Although a Bank operational policy (OP 4.01) 
requires  public  consultations  to  develop  the  Terms  of  Reference  for  an  environmental 
assessment,  consultations  are  typically  held  only  after  such  terms  have  been  produced. This 
remains true even though the Bank has found that many of its problem cases are related to 
deficiencies in spotting environmental issues early enough (Rukuba-Ngaiza et al. 2002: 9). 
 
In other words, public consultations typically do not occur until the problem to be addressed has 
already been framed and the proposed response has been formulated. This limits the scope of 
participation to refining specific project proposals, rather than enabling deeper forms of public 
engagement and accountability. As a result, many participants have concluded that consultations 
are  intended  primarily  to  gain  short-term  public  support  rather  than  to  improve  long-term 
effectiveness and legitimacy. 
 
Second, participation has also been weak during the monitoring and evaluation stages of the 
project cycle. The Quality Assurance Group at the Bank has identified poor quality monitoring 
and evaluation as one of four major “persistent problems” that have shown little improvement 
over the years (World Bank 2000d: 25). The Independent Evaluation Group has also found that 
only nine percent of sampled projects had participatory monitoring and evaluation, while an 
environmental assessment report found that only eight percent did so. Those that did, found them 
useful not only for improving implementation but also for cross-checking whether participants 
understood what the project impacts would be (Rukuba-Ngaiza et al. 2002: 16). Even those 
CSOs  that  are  subcontracted  to  help  implement  Bank  projects  rarely  participate  in  project 
evaluation (Ashman 2002: 8). This is despite growing evidence that participatory monitoring and 
evaluation can improve project sustainability, accountability, and ownership by affected people, 
can better enable implementing agencies to identify and respond to unanticipated problems, and 
can be used to capture lessons from individual projects in order to disseminate them throughout 
the institution (Ashman 2002; IFC Undated).  
 
Third, complaints about the poor quality of participatory processes in projects echo those raised 
at the global policy level. Civil society organizations have frequently complained that 
participatory processes in Bank- supported projects are ad hoc, arbitrary, and poorly 
administered. These complaints include “lack of clear and consistent parameters for consultation 
and feedback, arrogance or defensive posturing by Bank staff, lack of transparency about who is 
invited, late distribution of consultation documents, lack of translation, and lack of funds to 
cover CSO time and travel expenses” and lack of attention to alternative project options (World 
Bank 2005b: 16-17, para 32). As a result, consultations have often amounted to little more than 
information dissemination exercises,  in which affected peoples are notified of decisions that 
have already be taken elsewhere (Herz and Ebrahim 2005: Appendix F, p. 24).  
 
The Bank’s own reviews have largely concurred with this assessment. For example, OED found 
that participation is “often poorly planned and executed, rushed, superficial, failed to adequately 
include or protect the interests of marginalized groups, dominated by the more powerful and Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  26 
vocal, unrepresentative, or failed to make a difference” (World Bank 2000c: 11). Similarly, in its 
Issues and Options paper on Bank-Civil Society engagement, the Bank noted that “consultation 
guidelines are not widely followed,” and consultations “often occur in an arbitrary fashion with 
very short notice and/or very late in the process.” In part, this is because task managers tend to 
“‘tick the box’ that CSOs have been involved, rather than take proactive steps to ensure 
engagement is viewed as satisfactory by all stakeholders” (World Bank 2005b: 16). Best 
practice, in which participatory decision-making processes are developed through collaboration 
with local CSOs, governments, and appropriate international actors, remains the exception rather 
than the norm. Frustrations arising from this lack of deliberation and strategic clarity are further 




The problems of civil society access at various stages of the project cycle are further complicated 
by insufficient capacity in communities and CSOs to participate. This is a much greater problem 
for  civil  society  groups  operating  at  local  levels  than  at  the  global  level.  Local  CSOs  and 
communities often several different kinds of capacities to meaningfully participate in project 
decision  making:  (1)  the  ability  to  understand  and  critique  technical  issues;  (2)  sufficient 
knowledge of their rights under national law and Bank policy; and (3) the skills necessary to 
negotiate  with  more  powerful  actors.  Bank  efforts  to  build  capacity,  where  they  exist,  have 
tended to focus on technical skills. They typically do not seek to build long-term capacities or to 
enhance the negotiating and conflict resolution skills necessary for engaging with government 
officials and Bank staff (Rukuba-Ngaiza et al. 2002: 26; World Bank 2000c: 21). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Bank-led efforts to increase participation through capacity building are 
constrained by a lack of adequate funding and the absence of a centralized mechanism to support 
task manager initiatives. In a sign of change, however, the World Bank Institute is offering a 
growing number of training programs on process and empowerment issues. 
 
Finally, civil society efforts to hold the Bank to account for projects are severely constrained by 
two systemic factors. First the Bank currently lacks adequate systems for capturing lessons 
learned from CSO engagements, and for tracking participation. Various Bank reports have noted 
that there is a lack of reliable or accessible data to track, monitor, and evaluate engagement with 
CSOs. They have also noted that there has been a failure to develop appropriate indicators of 
impact and effectiveness of participation. This is compounded by training and knowledge 
management systems that are inadequate for the needs of task managers, and a recruitment 
process that favours technical competence over skills needed for participatory activities. 
Addressing these deficits remains a major challenge (World Bank 2000c: 27, 30; World Bank 
2005b: 16, para 31). 
 
Second,  there  are  few,  if  any,  meaningful  avenues  for  redress  for  citizens  who  believe  that 
participatory processes have not been sufficient, or that the concerns that they have raised have 
not been adequately addressed in a project. The Bank’s best-known accountability mechanism, 
the  Inspection  Panel,  is  not  well  suited  to  this  task  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  while  the 
Inspection Panel reviews compliance with mandatory and enforceable standards, there are few 
such standards with respect to participation for the Inspection Panel to apply. In most cases, 
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public participation is considered to be discretionary and “best practice.” And the policies that do 
require consultation, such as the Environmental Assessment Policy or the Indigenous Peoples 
Policy, do not provide clear standards for evaluating their adequacy. Because the operational 
procedures afford so much discretion to Bank staff, it is exceedingly difficult for the Inspection 
Panel to conclude that staff did not comply with consultation requirements. Second, because the 
Inspection Panel process can be cumbersome, it lacks the agility to respond to complaints about 
participation quickly enough that they can be redressed before the project moves forward and the 
issues are mooted. 
The  Bank  has,  however,  done  some  notable  work  to  improve  mechanisms  of  “social 
accountability,”  through  which  citizens  can  directly  engage  politicians  and  civil  servants  to 
improve public governance and service delivery. These include, for example, citizen report cards 
that provide a transparent mechanism for the public to assess the performance of public agencies 
(Malena, Forster and Singh 2004). But while the World Bank is increasingly supporting such 
initiatives among CSOs and governments around the world, it has failed to employ the same 
tools in its own operations.  
In  sum,  World  Bank  efforts  and  reforms  at  the  project  level  have  resulted  in  increased 
consultations with citizens and improved social and environmental protections, but with very  
limited  meaningful  influence  for  and  accountability  to  citizens.  The  absence  of  CSO 
participation throughout the project cycle has led some to view the World Bank’s consultations 
as mere gestures in which participants are “treated like decorations . . . but their inputs [aren’t] 
taken into account.”
54 In cases where inputs are considered but not accepted, the Bank does not 
generally explain its rationale. This sense of exclusion is aggravated by a disclosure policy that 
makes much information available only after key decisions have been made. And within the 
Bank, efforts to improve the quality of engagement are undermined by inadequate benchmarks 
and standards, as well as weak learning systems. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The successes of civil society actors in increasing accountability in the World Bank have largely 
been at the project and policy levels. Sustained civil society pressure has been important to the 
introduction of environmental and social safeguard policies in the Bank, and the implementation 
of independent complaint and response mechanisms such as the Inspection Panel and the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman. In this sense, CSOs have influenced the Bank at both the 
policy level by applying pressure to put safeguards in place, and also at the project level since 
that is where the safeguards and redress mechanisms are applied and where citizen participation 
can affect project design, implementation, and monitoring.  
Good faith engagement at the policy level, however, appears to be in decline as a result of 
numerous consultative experiences over the past decade that ended without clear evidence of 
progress from the perspectives of many civil society actors. Two further tests at the policy level 
are likely to arise before the end of the decade. The first will lie in how the Bank conducts the 
                                                 
54 This quote, made by a respondent in a consultation, is cited in two reports by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group (World Bank 2001a: 3; World Bank 2002c: 2). It is not clear from the report whether the statement was made 
by a representative from a donor agency, government, or CSO. Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  28 
upcoming review of its information disclosure policy and the degree to which it incorporates 
very predictable civil society demands for greater transparency and timeliness in the release of 
draft documents. The second major test will arise in the Bank’s  follow up to its anti-corruption 
consultations, and particularly on how seriously it engages civil society on issues of 
implementation. The consultative regime at the policy level is crucial to the Bank’s overall 
accountability landscape due to its tight coupling with the quality and enforceability of the 
compliance regime at the project level. The current ad hoc nature of policy level consultations 
and the resulting mismatches in expectations on the part of both civil society and Bank actors, 
have led to increasing skepticism about such engagements. A more cynical view, in the words of 
Srilatha Batliwala, is that the Bank has succeeded through its consultations in achieving “overt 
accommodation and covert containment” of civil society.
55 
Civil society actors have been far less active in efforts to improve accountability at the staff 
level, especially in terms of altering the incentive structure for staff promotion in the World 
Bank. The technocratic accountability regime in place at this level tends to reward and promote 
staff for their technical expertise and abilities to move money. This is not new, but appears to 
remain central in shaping Bank culture. No doubt, there are many Bank staff who value 
engagement with civil society actors (and many who have come from civil society) and who seek 
to promote downward accountability to communities and citizens. But incentives and resource 
allocations in the institution do not lend themselves to supporting the slow and sometimes 
controversial work involved in such engagement. The main reform push at this level has come 
from actors internal to the Bank, such as its Civil Society Team and Participation and Civic 
Engagement Unit, which remain comparatively small within the institution. 
The accountability gaps apparent at the level of board governance are perhaps the widest and 
least addressed, despite considerable civil society attention. The problems in this global capital 
regime — regarding vote allocation and executive director seats based on size of the economy, 
marginalization of borrowing governments most affected by Bank lending, lack of parliamentary 
scrutiny, and disproportionate U.S. influence including its role in presidential selection — are the 
most difficult because of their embeddedness in the global political economy. Yet, they are 
among the most crucial both in terms of the World Bank’s legitimacy as a public institution 
reflective of global democratic norms, and ultimately in terms of its effectiveness as 
developmental actor with a pro-poor and anti-poverty mission. It is at these two fundamental 
levels, of board governance and staff incentives, that the potential for more meaningful 
accountability is greatest but where the deep structure of the World Bank remains largely 
unchanged. 
 
                                                 
55 Discussant remarks in response to an earlier version of this paper, delivered at a workshop on Civil Society and 
Accountable Global Governance in Gothenburg, Sweden, June 13-15, 2007. Ebrahim and Herz; October 2007  29 
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Existing Mechanisms of 
Accountability 




•  Performance appraisals  
•  Department of institutional 
integrity (INT) 
•  Internal auditor 
•  Resources for public engagement 
are not mandated or allocated a 
priori 
•  Performance appraisals do not 
reward citizen engagement  
•  Lending pressures and a “culture 
of approval” 





•  Disclosure policy and 
public information centers 
•  Safeguard policies 
•  Independent Evaluation 
Group, Quality Assurance 
Group  
•  Inspection Panel and 
Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman  
•  Limitations in accessibility and 
timeliness of information 
•  Little citizen participation in 
project agenda-setting, design, 
monitoring, and evaluation 
•  No participation policy 
•  Short project cycles 
•  Constraints in the agility and 




•  Consultations with civil 
society 
•  Distribution of iterative 
drafts of policy revisions 
•  Explanations for why 
certain inputs are accepted 
or rejected  
•  Ad hoc protocols for policy 
formulation and design of 
consultations 
•  Lack of clarity in objectives of 
policy reviews 




(global capital regime) 
•  Appointment of board 
members by their 
governments, and vote 
weighting proportionate to 
size of economy 
•  Disclosure of board 
minutes (but not 
transcripts)  
 
•  Formula for allocation of votes 
and executive director seats that 
favors lending governments 
•  Absence of parliamentary scrutiny 
of board members and Bank 
activity 
•  Lack of transparency in board 
deliberation and voting 
•  Lack of transparency and 
competition in presidential 
selection process 
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